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Searching for Security: 
India’s Role in the Post-War Federal                                   
Democratic Republic of Nepal
This article aims to analyse New Delhi’s role 
in post-war Nepal, understood as part of its 
search for security in its periphery. India has 
been deeply involved in Nepali affairs since 
Independence, holding an influential position 
which has often engendered resentment, 
but which was nevertheless important in 
negotiating an end to the Maoists’ People’s 
War in 2006. Since engaging the Maoists, with 
whom New Delhi had a historically hostile 
relationship, India has appeared inclined to be 
seen as a supportive larger neighbour rather 
than an imposing regional hegemon. This, as an 
attempt to improve regional relations, can still 
be understood as an approach heavily defined 
by security concerns, supporting actors and 
strategies considered most conducive to 
stability; indeed Indian actors have a multitude 
of interests in Nepal, from border security to 
hydropower. 
In the post-war period Nepal faces many 
challenges, chief among which are the ever 
inconclusive constitution and peace process; 
these are essential to forging a Nepali state 
that is balanced between the many diverse 
political groups and inclusive of ethno-regional 
minorities, in order to ensure stability in Nepal 
and India’s sensitive Himalayan border region. 
It can thus be considered in India’s interests to 
support and engage the often divergent Nepali 
political groups, while avoiding appearing 
intrusive, to overcome the protracted and 
tumultuous political impasse and form a 
durable government. 
Keywords: Hindustan-Tibet Road, Northwestern Himalaya, 
British, environment, frontier, security.
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Introduction
As India gained independence, while its leaders spoke 
of  anti-imperial unity and regional cooperation, it faced 
various external and domestic dangers. The Indian state 
has encountered numerous threats to its population and 
territory, notably in clashes with Pakistan and China. Its 
regional policy has consequently been heavily shaped by 
these concerns, and as India has progressively emerged 
as a regional power the preoccupation with regional 
security and stability has been evident. Delhi’s sometimes 
heavy-handed pursuit of these objectives has often been 
badly received by neighbouring governments, particularly 
Kathmandu. 
Located in the geostrategically sensitive Himalayan region 
bordering Tibet/ China, Nepal is a key part of India’s 
periphery and well within Delhi’s influence. The shared 
open border, interconnected populations, and common 
waterways leave India very sensitive to domestic Nepali 
political and socioeconomic changes. 
The 2006 peace agreement which ended the decade-long 
Maoist “People’s War” culminated in the new secular 
Republic of Nepal, to become both democratic and federal. 
This upheaval was approached by Delhi in a sometimes 
apparently ambiguous manner, but it is evident that 
security-oriented concerns, rather than democratisation 
or other ideological motivations, have consistently guided 
Indian involvement in Nepal. 
To explore India’s current approach to Nepal, the paper 
first characterises the history of Indo-Nepali relations 
since Independence, before looking at India’s evolving 
approach to its neighbours. Subsequently, Delhi’s existing 
priorities regarding Nepal will be considered, before 
moving on to India’s role in the conclusion of the conflict 
and the post-conflict period. The following section will 
discuss the volatile Nepali political situation and the factors 
which are likely to inform Delhi’s future approach; this is 
shaped by multiple Indian interests, the positions of the 
“establishment” and hardliner Maoist parties and other 
influential actors, and the progress of the peace process 
and the constitution.
Indo-Nepali Relations since Independence 
Nepal shares India’s only open border, running mostly 
along the more densely populated lowland Tarai plains, 
adjacent to the Indian states of Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, 
Bihar, West Bengal and Sikkim. It is frequently crossed 
by Nepalis and Indians for work and family reasons, and 
indeed Nepalis may find employment in India without 
a work permit, even within the military. Beyond close 
interstate relations, their close proximity has given them 
important and sometimes evocative cultural and historical 
connections, particularly for lowland Nepalis and northern 
Indians. Symptomatic of this was the positive perception, 
among many Indians, of Nepal’s status as a Hindu kingdom.
India has been deeply involved in Nepali affairs ever since 
independence in 1947, encountering support and resistance 
from different quarters. This stems from landlocked Nepal’s 
longstanding economic dependence on India, for trade, 
significant aid, diplomatic support, essential supplies, 
and investment. Education and media links have also 
consolidated close sociocultural connections. Of its two 
increasingly powerful neighbours, only India can provide 
reasonable access to land and sea trade and transit routes; 
the high-altitude mountainous Himalayan terrain of the 
Chinese border offers few substantial, usable routes, which 
has significantly limited economic, and other, Sino-Nepali 
relations.
Delhi has long maintained a profound involvement in 
Nepal; following power struggles between the Rana prime 
minister and King Tribhuvan (Mishra 2004), the Indian 
government even drafted Nepal’s 1950 constitution, 
implemented despite a lack of Nepali consultation. 
Following the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations 
soon after Indian Independence, the Himalayan border 
region became extremely tense. Prime Minister Nehru’s 
government viewed Nepal, with Bhutan and Sikkim, as 
a “buffer region” where India would tolerate no foreign 
aggression. With the 1950 Chinese annexation of Tibet, 
Nehru quickly made defence treaties with these states, 
even offering Indian military assistance in the event of 
foreign attack. The 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty is 
often regarded in Nepal as an example of unequal bilateral 
relations (Adhikary 2011). Delhi has held heavy influence 
in Nepal’s military, especially before the treaty’s redrafting 
in the 1960s, and the requirement for mutual consultation 
before reacting to foreign security threats has been Indian-
biased in practice.
The 1962 Sino-Indian border war only served to reinforce 
Indian concerns in the strategic Himalayan region, 
and deepened Delhi’s engagement with Nepali affairs. 
This security-oriented perception has since heavily 
characterised Indian regional policy, and Delhi has 
sought deep relations with Himalayan governments, 
to build influence and security arrangements. This has 
been achieved comprehensively with Bhutan, and Sikkim 
was fully absorbed into the Indian federation in 1975, 
heightening Nepali concerns for their own independence. 
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Contemporaneous diplomatic exchanges indeed indicate 
that Delhi’s thorough involvement in Sikkim was used 
partly as a message to Kathmandu and Thimphu to induce 
cooperation (India Today 2013), and Birendra’s scepticism 
met warnings that Nepal could not expect a “privileged 
relationship” if insensitive to India’s “vital interests” 
(USDS 1974). 
While Delhi inconsistently supported insurgency 
operations against the undemocratic Nepali government 
in the 1950s, the 1962 Sino-Indian border war changed 
this (Destradi 2011). Delhi then pragmatically, if 
somewhat wearily, supported Nepal’s monarchy on the 
understanding that it cooperated with Indian interests, 
even restricting anti-monarchy activity by exiled Nepalis 
in India. This support safeguarded the absolute monarchy 
against domestic reformist pressures. 
King Mahendra’s reign from 1955, a few years after 
the Rana dynasty lost power, was barely a democratic 
improvement, ruling through the Panchayat system 
after dissolving parliament in 1960 (Kraemer 1999). This 
autocratic and exclusionary government repeatedly met 
dissent, setting the scene for the turbulent 1990s. National 
development did, though, become a priority (Croes 2006), 
bringing land reform and the East-West highway, an 
important project in which India was significantly involved 
(GoI 1966). Mahendra’s nationalism, imposing a Hindu 
Nepali identity, was notably anti-Indian and has influenced 
modern attitudes. As India and China began to establish 
themselves as regional powers, Nepali preoccupation with 
maintaining independence deepened. 
With Nepal’s dependence and relative international 
isolation under the Ranas, Mahendra looked to increase 
the Nepali military’s independence from India, expand 
Nepal’s international presence, and increase diplomatic 
relations with others, including China. Royal visits abroad 
noted economic changes made elsewhere, and this 
outward orientation caused lasting tension with Delhi.  
Kathmandu’s interest in reducing its dependence on India 
grew under King Birendra’s reign, from 1972 until 2001, 
and Nepali governments have certainly looked to Beijing, 
to Delhi’s unease. Beijing has consistently expressed 
interest in strengthening ties with Kathmandu, its 
strategic Himalayan neighbour. Indeed, Beijing has given 
Nepal substantial assistance for infrastructure, including 
transport development grants; domestic Chinese projects 
include developing railway links to their border, and 
even into Nepal. Nepali interest in Chinese options has, 
though, previously sparked dramatic tensions (Garver 
1991). Birendra’s government unprecedentedly planned 
to impose visas on Indian workers; this, along with Nepal’s 
diplomatically neutralising “zone of peace” declaration, 
was perceived by Delhi as retreating from their special 
relationship. The 1989 purchase of Chinese weapons was 
especially contentious; Delhi refused to sell Kathmandu 
anti-aircraft weapons, consequently pushing Kathmandu 
towards Chinese suppliers. Frustrated by Delhi’s perceived 
controlling approach, Kathmandu disputed the Indian 
argument that this was contradictory to their 1950 security 
treaty, contending that the treaty specified consultation 
was required only when arms purchases implicated Indian 
territory. Over the 1980s Indo-Nepali relations were thus 
severely strained, where Delhi became seriously concerned 
by Kathmandu potentially shifting towards Beijing. 
In this context, a rather minor disagreement over trade 
and transit treaties escalated into a serious dispute. 
Landlocked Kathmandu essentially wished to keep Indian 
trade separate from other trade via Indian transit. Rajiv 
Gandhi’s government’s hard-line reaction effectively 
placed economic sanctions on Nepal. At the previous 
treaties’ expiration the border ports, with few exceptions 
for essential goods (Mishra 2004), were closed on the 
basis that Indo-Nepali trade was no longer legally coded. 
This blockade completely disrupted Nepali economic 
life, and the resulting nationwide “Jan Andolan” protests 
put massive pressure on the monarchy. The security 
forces’ violent handling of demonstrations only escalated 
protests, mounting pressure such that Birendra was left 
little choice but to relinquish significant power and accept 
multiparty democracy. 
This confrontation illustrates well the nature of bilateral 
relations. Delhi has been able and prepared to use its 
economic power, and monopoly on Nepali trade ports, 
to maintain security relations. Here, Delhi’s economic 
pressure enforced its rigid stance that with the special 
economic relationship came the special security 
relationship, triggering governmental change. It is also 
evident that China has been unable to provide sufficient 
alternatives to India, or have a similarly deep influence; 
indeed, Beijing advised Birendra to engage with Indian 
demands. Beijing is, though, able to offer certain non-
Indian alternatives, including military equipment, 
affording Nepali actors the “China card” to play against 
Delhi.
Indo-Nepali relations have thus been characterised by this 
power imbalance. Low development and heavy economic 
dependence on India, and other foreign aid (Luitel 2009), 
has consolidated Delhi’s position in Nepali affairs, leading 
to repeated Nepali interest in alternatives. However, 
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the alternative is, effectively, China, and has thus been 
heavily discouraged by Delhi. This situation has inevitably 
engendered resentment, and the reaffirmation of a distinct 
Nepali identity. Lastly, it is clear that Nepal’s monarchy, 
which faced repeated domestic calls for democratisation, 
received India’s crucial support insofar as it cooperated 
with security interests.
India and its Smaller Neighbours
India’s regional policy, while perhaps often reactive 
and slowed by interparty differences, has nevertheless 
been consistently heavily shaped by security concerns, 
both external and internal. In pursuing those interests, 
its sometimes heavy approach has often been perceived 
as intrusive and overbearing by smaller neighbours, 
and, consequently, often backfires by generating non-
cooperation. This “big brother” perception has certainly 
hampered regional relationships, from Bangladesh’s 
controversial border management and the bilateral 
economic imbalance, to Sri Lanka’s civil war and Indian 
military involvement. The Indo-Nepali relationship 
is similarly affected, where dependence and Indian 
involvement have unsurprisingly generated resentment 
among Nepal’s political class; the widening trade deficit 
is indeed noted with concern in bilateral meetings (GoI 
2011b). 
Delhi has come to realise the negative implications of 
this perception, and has consequently become more 
sensitive to its regional image. Maldivian government 
change in early 2012 demonstrated this, where the 
apparently undemocratic removal of pro-India Prime 
Minister Nasheed met a rather neutral Indian reaction, 
diplomatically encouraging dialogue (Economic Times 
2012). It is clear that Delhi’s objective, wary of appearing 
intrusive, was to maintain a stable bilateral relationship 
rather than promote a particular party or type of 
governance. Delhi has genuine concerns regarding 
Maldivian stability and cooperativeness, including limiting 
external influence (Krishnan 2012) and the potential 
threat of militant Islam (Times of India 2012); this careful 
manner thus illustrates a more cautious regional policy. 
Nevertheless, Delhi has been prepared to take action in 
certain cases. The harsh stance towards pro-democracy 
Bhutanese groups in Indian territory, contrasted with 
Nepali Maoists, illustrates that Delhi is prepared to support 
undemocratic Thimphu while it cooperates closely with its 
security agenda.
Democratic India could be expected to hold a pro-
democracy foreign policy, particularly regionally, as 
friendly relations could be expected between similar 
states; additionally, India has great power aspirations and 
wishes to be seen internationally as an example. However, 
this has been overshadowed by concerns for security 
and image, and it thus wishes to avoid intrusiveness 
associated with Western interventionism (Mohan 2007). 
Furthermore, while India’s democracy is functioning, Delhi 
would be reluctant to have it internationally scrutinised. 
Consequently, democracy is carefully publicly supported, 
insofar as it does not undermine security. India’s regional 
policy can thus be understood as pro-democracy, but 
reluctant to be pro-democracy-promotion.
Delhi now wishes to be seen regionally as a “benevolent 
hegemon” (Destradi 2011), conducting supportive and 
friendly neighbourly relations. While India has struggled 
to play a fully hegemonic regional role, notably against 
challenges from Pakistan and China, it is undoubtedly the 
most powerful South Asian actor. It is keen to promote an 
integrated region, interconnected for common prosperity 
and development via organisations such as the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). India would 
thus benefit from being seen by neighbours as a partner 
rather than a threat; despite positive rhetoric, however, 
SAARC, its initiatives, and regional cooperation generally 
have thus far particularly suffered from protracted 
interstate disputes and weak cooperation (Chaturvedy 
and Malone 2009). While South Asia has seen several high 
national growth rates, poverty remains widespread and 
Nepal particularly has lagged behind. India’s size and 
location make it a crucial actor, and for SAARC to become 
more effective it would require, and benefit, Delhi to take 
a leading and cooperative role, in turn building its desired 
benevolent image. 
Given its increasingly cautious tendency, Delhi may be less 
inclined than previously to bluntly use economic power to 
pressure neighbours. It is the desired positive image that 
Delhi balances with politico-economic security interests 
in formulating Indian regional policy, and thus Delhi’s 
involvement in Nepal seeks to appear non-interfering, 
while simultaneously addressing numerous Indian 
interests.
Delhi’s Nepali Priorities
Indian actors have multiple interests in Nepal, which are 
all potentially affected by political change.
Delhi’s traditional “buffer region” perception of the 
Himalayan region persists, and limiting external influence 
remains a key objective, particularly of rival neighbours 
but also of other states and international agencies 
perceived as Western-biased. As Sino-Indian ties have 
generally improved with economic growth, this can be 
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considered less crucial than before, although China’s 
relative economic power and the significant bilateral 
trade deficit, of $17 billion in 2010, engenders Indian 
preoccupation, as explicitly noted in government strategy 
(GoI 2011b). Similarly, China’s recently markedly increased 
economic presence in Nepal is of Indian concern, including 
as competition for hydropower exploitation (ORF 2012). 
China’s ambassador to Nepal (Hindustan Times 2012) has 
in fact stated that Beijing and Delhi should cooperate 
for Nepal’s development, which could certainly involve 
trilateral infrastructure and transport improvement. 
Kathmandu has, though, cooperated in recent years 
with Beijing in controlling Nepal’s 20,000-strong Tibetan 
population, including restrictions on demonstrations 
for the Dalai Lama’s birthday and the 2008 uprisings’ 
anniversary. Nepali security forces have also returned a 
number of fleeing Tibetans to Chinese authorities, and 
have received some Chinese training, particularly for 
border control. However, Delhi’s deep engagement in 
Nepali affairs would likely at least limit future Chinese 
involvement in population control. This is an incendiary 
issue in India but, not representing a direct threat, 
would be unlikely to cause serious dispute; it is, though, 
liable to evoke traditional public sympathy and negative 
perceptions of China.
Under the monarchy, and subsequent governments, 
Beijing has shown interest in expanding economic links 
with Nepal, for trade and potential access to South Asian 
economies for its “Go West” strategy to develop poorer 
western regions (Mathou 2005). Developing Sino-Nepali 
economic links would benefit from amicable relations with 
influential India, and Beijing will thus balance this with 
the provocative Tibetan issue, liable to strain Sino-Indian 
relations. Kathmandu would undoubtedly be willing to 
expand trade relations, as an opportunity for non-Indian 
alternatives and to reaffirm friendly Sino-Nepali relations. 
The sheer difficulty of the Himalayan landscape, though, 
remains a hindrance to trade expansion, even with 
increased efforts to improve transport links.
The Naxalite insurgency has been described by Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh as India’s biggest internal 
security threat (Hindu 2010), and there have previously 
been suspected Nepali Maoist-Indian Naxalite links. Indian 
security agencies have previously feared a “compact 
revolutionary zone” (Mishra 2004), where Maoists and 
Naxalites would coordinate activities from Nepal to as far 
south as Tamil Nadu. Indeed, the Naxalite insurrection’s 
birthplace in Darjeeling District, West Bengal state, is 
close to the Nepali border, and lies in the narrow corridor 
to India’s politically sensitive north-eastern states 
(Chakravarti 2008). This possibility, however, appears 
to have faded, particularly with the Maoists entering 
mainstream politics and improving relations with Delhi.
The porous Indo-Nepali border remains a security concern, 
particularly regarding cross-border criminal networks and 
militants in poorer northern Indian states, which have 
an already strained capacity to fight high crime levels; 
indeed, following bomb attacks in early 2013 attempts 
were made to tighten border security (Economic Times 
2013). There are fears that India’s improved international 
flight connections have attracted drug traffickers, 
consequently drawing them to Nepal and their open 
border (Ethirajan 2013). Furthermore, Delhi’s external 
intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing 
(RAW), is troubled that Pakistani intelligence services are 
able to exploit the easy crossing to send agents, and fake 
Indian currency, into India; the delegitimisation of large 
banknotes has, however, hindered Nepali remittances 
and prompted Kathmandu to request its reconsideration 
(GoI 2011b). There is, lastly, disquiet over increased 
numbers of madrasas in the bordering Tarai region 
(ICG 2007) and a potential link to radical Islam. Border 
management is difficult due to its length, the extensive 
cross-border communal connections, and low policing 
capacity; furthermore, agreements made on the border’s 
demarcation remain in question by those who argue 
Nepal lost territory. However, the peace process and the, 
albeit slow, formation of a peacetime government should 
allow improvement in Nepal’s policing capacity and 
intergovernmental operations. 
Hydropower is of great interest to Delhi and it could 
certainly benefit both countries, although it is hindered by 
Nepal’s poor infrastructure and political instability. There 
is huge potential in Nepali hydropower estimated at over 
40,000 megawatts annually. However, in 2011 output was 
less than 1000 megawatts (Zhou 2011), showing massive 
underproduction of this renewable resource; indeed 
despite this abundance many Nepalis lack adequate access 
to power and water (McMahon 2006). The construction 
of hydropower plants, with much Indian investment, has 
been impeded by insecurity, but as Nepal stabilises both 
governments would likely look to develop hydropower for 
domestic use and export to India. Developing a Himalayan 
energy pool would be an initiative with potential for both 
long-term development and regional integration. Within 
Nepal, however, some may prefer the development of 
smaller-scale projects to simply meet local water needs, 
rather than potentially disruptive large-scale plants 
necessary to export energy. To encourage Nepali energy 
production for export, Delhi could certainly assuage 
resentment of previous Indian-biased water treaties 
with a more open approach to reviewing them, as well as 
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providing guarantees on Nepali energy needs; the bilateral 
agreement on Gandak irrigation and power project, 
for instance, has long been viewed as favouring Delhi, 
effectively giving it control and ownership of the works 
within Nepali territory (GoI 1959).
Interconnected waterways make water-sharing an 
important regional issue. Indeed, much of the Ganges’ 
water originates in or transits through Nepal, making 
cooperation indispensable to managing Indian flooding 
risks and dry periods. Over time, interstate agreement 
has been sought on how to manage these common water 
resources and routes (Dikshit 2012), but it is a sensitive 
issue, with early bilateral treaties widely viewed as Indian-
biased, and the unpredictable Nepali political situation 
further hinders negotiations.
Economically, Nepal’s reliance consolidates Delhi’s 
influential position. The interconnectedness of border-
region communities, though, is such that it would also 
benefit Indian localities to further develop economic 
links. Developing India’s poorer north-eastern states 
is an important domestic objective to address regional 
inequalities, and numerous initiatives, including transport 
subsidies to encourage industrialisation and trade, are 
articulated in government strategies (GoI 2012, 2013); 
this would certainly benefit from regional development. 
Furthermore, Nepali economic decline, with already high 
unemployment, would likely further increase economic 
migration across the border (Hangen 2011). Nepali 
migration could also exacerbate tensions which have 
flared up over recent decades in north-eastern India, 
between Indian Nepalis and ethnically-based militants 
who view them, among others, as “foreigners” (Nath 2005). 
This concern, and existing Indian investments, could be 
well served by improved regional transport links; indeed, 
infrastructure is seen as the “single most important 
constraint” to increasing Indian exports (GoI 2011a: 9), and 
projects such as the Indo-Nepali border road (Shah 2013) 
are thus important.
Delhi would undoubtedly favour a functioning Nepali 
democracy, but its wariness of intrusive democracy 
promotion makes it likely to support democratic processes 
according to where other Indian interests permit. 
Primarily, Indian actors would favour a cooperative 
government which is sensitive to the aforementioned 
concerns. Political stability in neighbouring states 
is, consequently, an important Indian objective, as 
unpredictable neighbours present a risk to regional and 
domestic security, particularly true for geostrategically 
important Nepal. A coherent, cohesive and durable Nepali 
political system, democratic insofar as possible, would thus 
be a relief for India’s Himalayan interests, and a primary 
objective of Delhi’s regional policy.
With this plurality of interests, Delhi responded in a 
sometimes ambiguous manner to Nepal’s civil war, which 
ended the 240 year-old monarchy and established the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, with the often 
hostile Maoists emerging as a leading force. Delhi’s 
involvement during and after the war illustrates both 
Indian regional priorities and the particular bilateral 
relationship.
The Civil War and Peace Process – India’s Role
Amidst the frustrated democratic movement, in 1996 the 
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) launched the 
People’s War against the Hindu monarchy (Hutt 2004), 
with the promise of change gradually garnering support 
particularly among marginalised communities and poorer 
regions (Whelpton 2005). Primary objectives included: 
land reform, so important to many Nepalis dependent on 
agriculture; ending neo-feudalist structures; reforming 
unequal water agreements with India; and establishing 
a secular people’s republic. The war, which claimed an 
estimated 17,800 lives (Nepal News 2012b) and displaced 
many more, escalated into full-scale military engagement 
between the rurally-based Maoists and the Royal Nepali 
Army (RNA) by 2001, before reaching a stalemate. 
For most of the war Delhi publicly supported Nepal’s 
monarchy, condemning Maoist “terrorism” (GoI 2002). 
Delhi considered that the best option for political 
stability was backing the “twin pillars” (Destradi 2011) 
of monarchy and parliament. The Indian Armed Forces, 
along with others including the USA, thus provided 
effectively continuous support to the RNA, including 
training and equipment. Delhi criticised the increasingly 
undemocratic behaviour of King Gyanendra, but without 
taking significant action; India halted support once, but 
briefly, due to fears that the monarchy would turn to other 
options. Apart from the threat to a friendly government, 
suspected Naxalite links also motivated Delhi’s staunch 
anti-Maoist stance.
Gyanendra’s reign, following Birendra’s death in the 2001 
palace massacre, seriously eroded democracy. As the 
authoritarian monarchy’s control wavered, Delhi looked 
to politically include the Maoists and quietly facilitated 
talks between rebels and parliamentary parties as early 
as 2002, while publicly supporting the monarchy; indeed 
Indian diplomats continued to engage the monarchy 
throughout the conflict. Importantly, Maoist figures, such 
as leader Pushpa “Prachanda” Kamal Dahal, were accorded 
safe-haven in Indian territory (Baral 2012), and India’s 
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crucial covert-operations RAW developed substantial 
relations with the Maoists. Notably, during negotiations 
in 2005, future prime minister Baburam Bhattarai was an 
important Maoist contact (Adhikary 2011). These parallel 
approaches to the conflict allowed the Indian government 
to provide neutral, private platforms for Nepali actors to 
negotiate. Indian officials are careful not to describe this 
as “mediation,” which could imply excessive involvement. 
However, these talks ultimately facilitated the agreement 
to end Gyanendra’s rule, leading to the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA 2006); Delhi thus played a crucial 
role in peace negotiations. 
Ignoring diplomatic advice, in February 2005 Gyanendra 
enforced direct royal rule and the resulting loose ex-
parliamentary coalition, the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), 
agitated against this takeover, demanding an all-party 
government and peace negotiations. Gyanendra’s coup 
thus inadvertently drove, with Indian assistance, a 
rapprochement between Maoists and parliamentary 
parties (Destradi 2011). 
In 2006 Gyanendra’s unpopular direct rule became 
increasingly untenable, culminating in nationwide 
demonstrations, “Jan Andolan II.” This lost the monarchy, 
and the RNA, India’s official support, and Delhi publicly 
endorsed establishing an inclusive democratic government 
to negotiate peace. Indeed, diplomatic cables indicate 
that this became quietly considered just shortly after 
Gyanendra’s takeover (Narayan 2011). Delhi came to regard 
this as the best option to stabilise Nepal, which, between 
the untenable monarchy, excluded parliamentary parties, 
mass public mobilisation, the RNA, and entrenched Maoist 
rebels, was on the brink of institutional disintegration. 
India’s “twin pillars” approach became unworkable as the 
pillars had stopped supporting each other. In April 2006 
Gyanendra was thus forced to reinstate parliament.
This apparent shift in Delhi’s approach can be understood 
as a “forward-looking attempt to stabilise Nepal” (Destradi 
2011: 16). This followed from the realisation that the 
Maoists had to enter the political mainstream, and that 
the faltering monarchy must be allowed to fall to avoid 
further violence. It does not, then, represent a significant 
change in Indian foreign policy, but that Delhi supported 
a more democratic solution to the conflict when it became 
perceived as the safest option. The attitude towards 
the Maoists may also have been influenced by the then 
Indian government’s composition. In the ruling United 
Progressive Alliance were a number of far-left groups 
which were likely more prepared to engage the Maoists, 
contrasting with Hindu-based parties sympathetic to 
Nepal’s Hindu monarchy.
Following the Nepali parliament’s reinstatement, the 
monarchy was disempowered by an overwhelming vote, 
the CPA signed in November 2006, and a Maoist-led 
interim government formed. The United Nations Mission 
in Nepal (UNMIN) was established in January 2007 with a 
rather limited mandate to monitor the peace process and 
support elections (Suhrke 2009), achieving some success 
in encouraging peaceful interparty dialogue. Delhi’s 
rather ambivalent position towards UNMIN and other 
international actors drew criticism of a controlling attitude 
towards the peace process. In April 2008 the CPN-M won 
an unexpected plurality of seats at the first, contentious, 
Constituent Assembly (CA) elections, disappointing Delhi’s 
hopes of a weak Maoist electoral performance. The lack 
of a decisive majority, however, prevented the Maoists 
from solely dominating the government which, with the 
historic first session of 28 May 2008 proclaiming a republic, 
began the protracted peace process, with compromise on 
central issues seemingly impossible between turbulent 
coalitions. An official visit of Prime Minister Prachanda 
to India, though, publicly reaffirmed friendly relations, 
even yielding a commitment to reviewing the resented 
1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship (GoI 2008). The 
CPN-M reunified with the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Unity Centre-Masal) in 2009, creating the current 
Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) and 
adding to the party more mainstream-minded members, 
undoubtedly more amenable to international actors, 
including Delhi. 
Over 2009 and 2010, Indian-Maoist relations were 
difficult, however, particularly due to perceived Maoist 
interest in Beijing. Prachanda, likely influenced by Maoist 
hardliners, was seen as antagonistic by Delhi and other 
parties. Following his attempt to demission the head of 
the military and the subsequent clash with President Ram 
Baran Yadav, Prachanda resigned as prime minister in May 
2009. India supported opposition parties and the military 
against the Maoists’ strong parliamentary position. By 
this point, Nepali actors were unlikely to readily return to 
conflict, as even in the stalemate most realised they had 
more to gain in mainstream politics (ICG 2010). As such, 
interparty disagreement became a less immediate threat to 
the Nepali state, and it can be interpreted that Delhi found 
more room to pressure the Maoists without risking serious 
instability.
Deadlock continued after the eventual appointment of 
Maoist Bhattarai, a broadly acceptable option for both 
Delhi and Maoists, as prime minister in late 2011; the 
Maoists’ relations with India and their alliance with 
Madhesi parties improved, though, leaving the Nepali 
HIMALAYA Volume 33, Numbers 1 & 2 |  17
Congress (NC), traditionally supported by both, feeling 
somewhat insecure. Indeed, an official prime ministerial 
visit to India in 2011 allowed a reaffirmation of strong 
bilateral relations and an implicit acceptance of the 
Maoist-led government, and several memorandums 
of understanding were signed to facilitate trade and 
assistance (GoI 2011c). UNMIN withdrew in January 
2011, passing ex-combatant cantonments to government 
administration, and in the more cooperative atmosphere 
the peace process finally appeared promising (ICG 2011b), 
The November 2011 deal on contentious ex-combatant 
integration showed the Maoist leadership’s willingness 
to relinquish the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and 
participate fully in civilian politics. 
While often more reactive than pre-emptive, Delhi’s 
policy did consistently focus principally on attempting 
to stabilise conflict-stricken Nepal, and its support 
primarily followed the groups, actors and political 
structures which it considered most conducive to this. 
By supporting or opposing certain actors, Delhi may 
be perceived, particularly within Nepal, as having had 
a destabilising effect. Delhi, however, is constrained to 
making calculations based on its perception of what is 
most likely to make Nepal more predictable and safeguard 
its interests. 
Delhi’s engagement with insurgent Maoists during the 
conflict may be regarded as resulting from an interest 
in asserting influence over less stable, and consequently 
more dependent, neighbours. However, Nepal’s 
seemingly inextricable economic dependence on India 
already provides huge leverage, and it would appear 
that a search for stability would be more strategically 
beneficial than instability; important Indian investments, 
especially in hydropower, would not benefit from violent 
unrest; instability also only further complicates border 
management and minimising external influence. The 
Maoists’ inclusion was also driven by the hope that 
Naxalite links would fade, and to lessen their propensity to 
look towards Chinese alternatives. After the CPA, however, 
Delhi remained wary of the Maoists gaining too much 
power, especially under Prachanda.
If the Maoists had eventually seized state control it 
would be an even more worrying precedent for regional 
governments, as an inspiration to other insurgent groups, 
than their being drawn into the political mainstream, 
albeit following sustained insurrection. This end-result 
can be appropriated to demonstrate the need for dissident 
groups to peacefully participate in national politics rather 
than to fight their way to power, and is thus useful to Delhi 
regarding India’s own dissidents.
The deep level of involvement, from military support to 
facilitating SPA-Maoist talks, illustrates Delhi’s particular 
position in Nepali affairs, and readiness to use it. Its 
involvement demonstrates that Delhi’s perception 
of Nepal has consistently been heavily informed by 
security interests and the desire for a stable, cooperative 
Himalayan neighbour, rather than by democratisation or 
ideological motivations.
Moving to the Future: Negotiating the Peace Process
The CA’s demise and the ongoing political impasse have 
varying implications for Indian interests, but valuable 
compromises and the peace process’ general progression 
were certainly positive from Delhi’s perspective. Due 
to traditional opposition to perceived excessive Indian 
influence, any Nepali government would not like to be 
seen as overly dependent, especially regarding domestic 
matters. However, any government would be unlikely 
to openly discriminate against Indian interests, as major 
political parties are conscious of the inevitably close 
relationship and the strategic importance of Indian 
support, both to strengthen their own political positions 
and deliver long-term economic development to Nepalis. 
Indian Interests
India’s biggest investments in Nepal are in hydropower, 
particularly from companies such as Reliance Industries 
and GMR. While projects with Indian companies have 
been slow-starting, a fact pointedly noted in bilateral 
meetings (GoI 2011b: 10), even the Maoist leadership has 
come to view India as central to economic development. 
Despite Delhi’s concerns, however, Chinese investment 
is considered important, and Prachanda has stated (Jha 
2012b) the importance of finding an appropriate balance 
between their neighbours. The Maoist leadership’s interest 
in expanding international engagements has caused 
friction before and could well again, especially with 
increasing Chinese presence in Nepal; indeed, Prachanda’s 
April 2013 visit to China, seeking investment and “equal 
ties” with India and China (Adhikari 2013b), was unlikely 
to be welcomed in Delhi.
Nevertheless, Delhi will likely pressure Kathmandu to 
refrain from awarding contracts to Chinese companies, 
particularly in areas close to the Indo-Nepali border 
such as Lumbini. Lumbini, known as Gautama Buddha’s 
birthplace, is of great cultural importance to many Nepalis 
and Indians. It became a UNESCO world heritage site 
in 1997, and plans to increase accessibility for pilgrims 
and tourists have included an airport (Ekantipur 2011). 
The Beijing-backed NGO “Asia Pacific Exchange and 
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Cooperation Foundation” (APECF), supported by then 
prime minister Prachanda, proposed the development 
of Lumbini into a “special development zone”. After 
controversy over a lack of transparency and inter-
agency communication (Krishnan 2011), a Memorandum 
of Understanding between APECF and the Lumbini 
Development National Directive Committee was signed 
in 2012 (Bhattarai 2012). Importantly, later proposals to 
connect Lumbini to Buddhist pilgrimage sites in India 
(Himalayan Times 2012) may assuage Delhi’s concerns of 
Chinese influence so close to its border.
Potential terrorism, or strike action able to paralyse 
Nepal’s limited infrastructure, could threaten Indian 
interests. Hydropower plants are typically away from 
urban areas or infrastructure used by other industries; 
however, strikes could affect the plants’ staffing and 
production. Strikes may be triggered by events ranging 
from rising fuel prices to political protest. Nepal’s hilly 
terrain makes the few highways vulnerable as targets, 
as traffic disruption is an effective strategy. Indeed, over 
2011 there were several large strikes, and they can affect 
external trade. Similarly, any sabotage attacks against 
Indian or government projects could damage costly 
installations. Such attacks by Maoist supporters, though, 
have declined with their move into mainstream politics 
(Republica 2013). 
Equally, increasingly mobilised ethno-regional groups, 
dissatisfied with the progression of federalism, may 
conduct small-scale attacks. Indeed, on 27 February 2012 
a bomb exploded near offices of the state-owned Nepal Oil 
Corporation, killing at least three people (WSJ 2012); this 
attack is uncharacteristically large in the post-war period, 
and was claimed by the “United Ethnic Liberation Front.” 
On 30 April 2012 a bomb killed 5 people (France24 2012), 
targeting a strike claiming a Maithili federal province. 
Various other attacks occurred over 2012 (SATP 2012), 
especially as the CA neared expiration and interparty 
negotiations accelerated; while fewer than in previous 
years, they demonstrate the potential for violence, notably 
by ethnically-based groups such as the Janatantrik Tarai 
Madhes Mukti Morcha. Madhesi parties and identity-based 
groups have threatened public mobilisation if the federal 
agenda is not sufficiently pursued (Jha 2012c). Stark ethno-
regional inequality is a major cause of tension in Nepal, 
and these divisions have translated clearly into political 
allegiances. Initiatives to promote more even, pro-poor 
development and inclusive government, such as land 
reform, literacy campaigns, and improved local councils, 
would be important measures for Nepal’s long-term 
stability, and should thus be supported by international 
actors, particularly India.
Federalism is certainly an explosive issue. While there is 
a level of Indian sympathy for Madhesi regional claims, it 
would be practically easier for Delhi to work with a unitary 
Nepali state, rather than various regional authorities, 
particularly in water-sharing and hydropower. However, 
a stable state is of primary importance, for which a 
condition is safeguarding the peace process and various 
federalist ambitions, especially in the border region. 
There are undoubtedly practical difficulties, including 
boundaries and state-naming, to resolve for durable and 
peaceful federalism, but neglecting federalist ambitions 
could worsen communal tensions.
Another security concern is the possible destabilisation of 
the Tarai region, which is comparatively developed and 
important as the traditional base for mainstream Nepali 
parties (ICG 2010). There is a potential risk from both a 
resurgence of kidnappings (Pokharel 2012), or mobilisation 
of ethno-regional groups, in particular Madhesis who 
have cultural, economic, and familial links in bordering 
Indian states. As such, Delhi has a direct security interest 
in backing Nepali federalism which is acceptable for both 
central political parties and regional groups.
The CA: Demise and Deadlock
Despite tortuously slow negotiations, the peace process 
substantially progressed in early 2012, and Indian 
diplomatic staff were important to facilitating more 
sincere inter-party discussions. After the peace process’ 
formal end (Times of India 2013), however, points of 
tension remain which may threaten stability and must 
be accounted for by Delhi. Over 2012 the cantonments 
closed and the remaining ex-combatants finally received 
military integration (Pun 2012). However, many cadres 
were discontented by the Maoist leadership’s compromises 
and corruption allegations (Republica 2012c). Furthermore, 
the failure to prosecute war-time crimes (Adhikari 2013a), 
largely due to the major parties’ fear of investigation, 
undoubtedly engenders resentment of injustice which 
could spark future tension.
The CA’s failure to meet the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional deadline in May 2012, and its subsequent 
controversial dissolution, led Nepal into another impasse 
(Sharma 2012). The PLA‘s effective end overcame a major 
constitutional obstacle, now replaced with identity-
based federalism. This is such a volatile, polarising issue 
as Nepal’s diverse minorities now vocally reject their 
longstanding marginalisation by a unitary state imposing 
a Hindu, hill, upper-caste, Nepali identity; indeed, this 
segment of society remains disproportionately represented 
in post-war political elites. More inclusive government is 
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needed to address structural inequalities and underlying 
causes of tension. 
The Maoists have derived significant support from ethno-
regional groups in backing identity-based federalism (ICG 
2011), and the NC and the Communist Party of Nepal-
Unified Marxist-Leninist (UML) also reluctantly accepted 
federalism accounting for minority representation. 
Scepticism persists, regarding group interests or national 
unity, but its inclusion in the peace process and interim 
constitution, its widespread support, and the potential 
unrest should it be abandoned, make federalism dangerous 
to neglect. Indeed, losing ethnically-based support would 
significantly weaken the main parties. 
The major parties’ continued failure to promulgate a 
constitution, along with unclear policy, threatens to 
undermine their credibility and legitimacy for the tired 
Nepali public. Parties, and politicians, have been heavily 
distracted from constitutional matters with power-play 
(Taggart 2012; Hindu 2012). Smaller ethno-regional groups 
have proliferated and the fractured political landscape 
has worsened communal polarisation. Shifting alliances 
have continued to shift, and major parties have all suffered 
factionalism and division (Republica 2012b). Following 
the CA’s dissolution, the Maoists split and the Madhesi 
Morcha front fragmented, weakening the ruling Federal 
Democratic Republican Alliance. The UML’s stance 
towards India has remained more amiable than originally 
(Hachhethu 1999), although their leadership’s apparent 
interest in Chinese economic involvement may cause 
friction (Himalayan Times 2013). The NC and UML have 
lost members, largely due to their underlying hostility to 
ethnic federalism. Delhi may prefer a more stable, unified 
Madhesi political force to balance Maoist electoral power 
but, while holding similar federal aims, Madhesi parties’ 
propensity to split may weaken their bargaining power. 
This volatility, rendering comprehensive engagement with 
important actors difficult, will certainly be watched with 
concern from India.
The long-threatened separation of the hardliner Maoist 
faction from mainstream “revisionists” finally came 
in the aftermath of the CA’s demise, led by dogmatic 
war-time leader Mohan Baidya “Kiran” to form the new 
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, which should simplify 
negotiations with the two parties not having to balance 
divergent factional differences. However, the division of 
members, support bases, and the affiliation of trade unions 
and ex-combatants can only diminish mainstream Maoist 
bargaining power, and factionalism continues. Several 
points of tension could spark dispute, including the ex-
combatants’ fate and use of infrastructure, representing a 
risk for Indian interests. Formally dividing assets would be 
important to avoid clashes.
Kiran’s party, yet another actor, adheres 
uncompromisingly to original Maoist objectives, 
and is prone to anti-India rhetoric, fearing Nepal’s 
“Sikkimisation.” Kiran has consistently criticised Indian 
“expansionism” and “interference,” including water 
resource agreements, and suspected Chief Justice Regmi’s 
election government of being “designed” by India (Nepal 
News 2012a; IDSA 2013). This faction felt side-lined from 
decisions on Maoist party policy, the constitution and 
the PLA (ICG 2012b); Kiran, and others, were detained in 
India while the CPA was adopted. The Prachanda faction 
is seen as having gained most from the peace process, 
and Kiran’s perception of Delhi as key in undermining its 
position has undoubtedly deepened mistrust. This was 
evident following the split, when Indian states bordering 
Nepal were alerted to perceived security risks (Kumar 
2012). Kiran’s party has previously threatened armed 
insurrection (Republica 2012a), although it is now likely to 
focus on its strength and anti-government agitation. While 
relatively small, and Kiran’s sceptical view of identity 
claims over class may eventually undermine certain 
tactical connections, many members are recognisable 
war-time Maoist leaders, and it could capitalise on 
general dissatisfaction and resentment of ex-combatants’ 
fates. Despite difficulties, Delhi and other parties must 
effectively politically include it. Expressing willingness to 
review bilateral agreements, including border demarcation 
and bilateral trade, could help to allay Nepali fears of 
Indian imperialism and soften Delhi’s relations with 
important actors.
India’s political elite is very different to Nepal’s Maoists, 
sharing more historical commonalities with the NC. 
However, it would be impractical not to engage those who 
have catalysed change , even with a weakened electoral 
performance in November 2013” (BBC 2013); importantly, 
in the mainstream the Maoists’ propensity to large-
scale dissent has lessened. Furthermore, a hostile “big 
brother” attitude could well engender anti-India sentiment 
within Nepal and regionally. Prachanda has noted Delhi’s 
importance, both past and future, to advancing the peace 
process; it was even stated that India should change the 
perception of the Maoists as “distant” (Jha 2012b). This 
certainly indicates that Delhi’s pragmatic engagement 
yielded improved relations with Maoist leaders, and is thus 
likely to be strategically maintained.
Various smaller actors, often ethnically-based, must be 
engaged to avoid radicalisation or non-cooperation with 
parliamentary processes. While of marginal strength, 
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rightist groups, particularly the monarchist Rastriya 
Prajatantra Party (Nepal), have become more visible. The 
monarchy has little public support, but certain features 
of the old system may represent to some an attractive 
stability amid volatility. Far-right actors, and Kiran’s party, 
may cause anti-Indian displays to exploit nationalist fears. 
Indeed, the prolonged uncertainty leaves more space 
for political fragmentation and pressure from regressive 
or extremist forces undermining post-CPA gains. Delhi 
would thus benefit from reducing this space by working 
to improve political dialogue and encourage major parties 
to better accommodate minority concerns, including by 
ensuring partial proportional representation.
To safeguard previous achievements the constitutional 
process must be restarted and the legislative vacuum 
resolved. Disagreement among the political plethora 
has been profound, especially on how and when to hold 
elections. Parties were apprehensive of unpredictable, 
fragmented results and risks of violence are genuine, but, 
despite seemingly inescapable power-play (Radio Australia 
2012), CA elections were finally held in November 2013. 
Further political fragmentation would complicate Indo-
Nepali relations, and the prospect of adequate settlements 
for the constitution and state structure may drift even 
further away; the successful elections thus provide some 
hope for rejuvenated interparty discussion. 
Despite Delhi’s cautious inclination, Indian pressure 
has the potential, more than perhaps any other factor, 
to push parties towards power-sharing (Jha 2012a) and 
collectively promulgating the constitution; indeed, Delhi’s 
role was crucial to the 2008 CA elections. At the CA’s end, 
at least parts of the Indian government were amenable to 
elections to determine a fresh inter-party balance, partly 
due to frustration with the NC and UML’s ineffectiveness 
in negotiations and inability to manage their parties. Delhi 
has not strongly pushed a particular path, and continued 
to support Bhattarai prior to elections, but increased 
Chinese involvement undoubtedly makes a solution more 
urgent. Bhattarai’s appointment of Lila Mani Poudel as 
chief secretary of government, perceived as pro-China (ICG 
2012a), was not welcomed. 
An indefinite constitutional impasse risks further political 
fragmentation and unrest, which was evident following 
the CA’s dissolution. Negotiations, and the state structure, 
must thus be seen as inclusive and not hijacked by any 
one group. It is in Delhi’s interests to encourage dialogue 
to avoid an elusive settlement rendering Nepal’s political 
class, and consequently their state, less stable.
Conclusions
In line with its typically security-oriented regional policy, 
Delhi has consistently chosen to support political actors 
which it calculated likely to have a stabilising effect within 
Nepal, be cooperative with Indian strategic interests, and 
minimise external involvement. This played out during 
the war, where the parallel approaches of informally 
engaging the Maoists while publicly supporting the 
monarchy afforded Delhi important options. The Maoists’ 
inclusion came with the realisation that they needed to 
enter the political mainstream, and the monarchy’s fate 
passed to public pressure, to avoid national destabilisation. 
The improved Indian-Maoist relations illustrate Delhi’s 
increased inclination to be seen to act carefully and 
non-intrusively in neighbouring states, insofar as Indian 
security interests permit.
While policy may appear reactive, there has been a 
significant continuity in Indian interests in Nepal. Limiting 
instability from cross-border and domestic threats, via 
management of the porous Indo-Nepali border, is of 
primary importance. The “buffer region” perception of 
the Himalayan region persists, and Delhi particularly 
wishes to avoid increased Chinese presence. Hydropower 
investments and water-sharing are issues which have 
developed over recent years and will be important to 
bilateral relations. Additionally, Nepal’s economic and 
hydropower development could increase trade with 
northern Indian states, assist regional integration, and 
address energy needs. These interests would all be best 
served by a stable Nepali state. A fully democratic state 
would be preferred, and appears feasible; nevertheless, 
while Delhi supports democracy in principle, it is willing to 
accept governments which at least cooperate with national 
interests, rather than risk instability by pressing for 
democratic reform. Such pragmatism is likely to continue, 
and indeed a softer, longer-term approach to Nepal’s 
socioeconomic development, state-building, and bilateral 
relations is more likely to yield durable institutions. 
The Nepali political class is unstable, rendering it slow 
to act or consistently form policy (ICG 2010). Along with 
Nepal’s economic dependence and close cross-border ties, 
Delhi’s influence is likely to remain profound. Ongoing 
unpredictable volatility in Nepal, and increased Chinese 
presence, make India’s approach likely to remain cautious 
and security-biased; however, if parliamentary and 
constitutional processes improve, providing stability, 
and Chinese influence is not perceived as threatening, 
other motivations such as democratisation or regional 
integration may become more prevalent in Indian policy.
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Delhi’s pragmatic approach afforded a more cooperative 
relationship with the mainstream Maoists since 2011, vital 
for Kathmandu’s future stability and Indian interests. 
This should allow a more distanced stance, which 
would indeed be preferred to strengthen a “supportive 
neighbour” image. However, the anti-Indian Kiran 
party’s split, a weaker mainstream Maoist party, and 
the pluralisation of smaller groups only complicates 
Delhi’s engagements, and mainstream Maoist leaders’ 
interest in China may undermine friendly relations. 
Indian pressure, though, may be indispensable to push 
Nepali parties towards cooperation and indeed Delhi’s 
interests would benefit from improved dialogue, thus 
reducing space for regressive forces; it must be employed 
tactically and sensitively to create a positive relationship, 
with diplomatic support rather than economic threats. 
Reviewing past bilateral agreements would be important 
for Delhi to allay longstanding fears of imperialism and 
soften relations with Nepali actors.
Within Nepal, factionalism is rife and alliances remain 
dependent on constitutional progression, including the 
Maoist-Madhesi collaboration. If the federal aspirations of 
vocal ethno-regional groups are insufficiently addressed, 
destabilising dissent and a withdrawal of ethnically-based 
support for major parties could cause further political 
fragmentation. The promulgation of a constitution 
could well reshape party alliances, in turn affecting 
Indian interests, but a widely accepted settlement would 
nevertheless improve stability.
The nascent atmosphere of improved cooperation may 
have been seriously threatened by the CA’s demise in May 
2012, but all parties must revive it to safeguard post-CPA 
gains and avoid a resolution, for the constitution and 
governmental system, being elusive indefinitely. Indeed, 
the fragile post-war Nepali state may not be strong enough 
to resist fragmentation if mainstream Maoists, Kiran’s 
party, other Nepali groups, or Delhi employ more heavy-
handed methods used before, which would ultimately 
undermine the security of Nepal, India’s northern states, 
and the multitude of groups therein. 
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